What if India had a Proportional Electoral System?

With 2024 being widely dubbed the “year of elections",  many across the world are taking to the polls with bated breaths and hopes of a bright future for their respective countries. Yet it is worth noting that, amidst this common spirit across many countries, there is nonetheless one big separating factor in most cases: the electoral system.

Illustration by The Geostrata

Indeed, the precise constitutionally enshrined means by which different countries convert their citizens' votes into actual seats in their legislative assemblies are subject to immense differences. 

An electoral system is neither the product of a straightforward decision nor one that can be taken spontaneously on the basis of unbiased rationality. Rather, it is dynamic, a living, breathing organism shaped through generations of socio-political decisions and conditions in a given polity.

For the sake of argumentation, however, it is fun to dabble in hypotheticals. For instance, the prospect of India adopting some form of proportionality to make elections more representative is definitely an enticing one. However, before we jump the gun and come to conclusions regarding what is most robust for our democracy, it is important to balance out the pros and cons of each system.

HAVE WE OUTLIVED THE “MAJORITY TAKES ALL” MODEL?

Given Britain’s far-reaching influence on political institutions, primarily a result of its colonial ventures, many countries have gone the Westminster way in adopting what is called the “First Past the Post” (FPTP) system. India happens to be one of those examples. Although naturally occurring nuances exist across how the different variations of this FPTP system play out, the fundamentals are pretty evident. 

In any given constituency, each party fields one candidate, and the one with the most votes in that particular constituency takes the entire seat and all of its glory with it. Plain, simple, and decisive. However, it is important to consider that this is only one side of the story. If you give it time, certain issues do emerge. For starters, a substantial chunk of voters will gradually become disillusioned with such a system, given that by voting for the losing candidate, their valuable and cherished vote is, for all purposes, going to waste. 

In many circumstances, the phenomenon known as “Duverger’s Law” might kick in. Essentially, this entails that in a majoritarian system, smaller parties will hardly get any seats and, with time, get completely pushed into the fray. The entirety of the political arena will ultimately remain dominated by two parties.

While this has not yet happened in India due to the prominence of various regional parties and complex social cleavages, the UK and the USA have both devolved into a two-party format.

Added to that is the criticism that such an arrangement all too often leads to an excessively majoritarian parliament, incapable of keeping the executive under any meaningful supervision. Thus, in various cases, an overly strong majority could very well threaten the finely curated trias politica system of checks and balances between the three organs (executive, legislative, and judicial). However, before completely disregarding FPTP for its shortcomings, let us consider the alternative. 

WHAT ABOUT MAKING EVERYTHING PROPORTIONAL?

Let us consider an alternative, one in which the representation in parliament is similar to the actual share of votes that each party received. This can again be done in a number of ways, but the basic principle is that the number of votes received by the party would be, to quite a degree, proportional to the number of seats they go on to win.

The emphasis here is also on parties rather than voting for individuals, thereby reducing the personalisation of the political process and subsequent power. In essence, this would have a two-fold aim. Firstly, it seeks to prevent an unchecked majority-backed executive by prioritising discourse and deliberation-based decision-making. Secondly, it aims today’s make every citizen's vote count, at least symbolically.  

There are many systems across the world that have sought to reconcile the two diametrically opposite approaches through “mixed member proportionality." Notably, these were Germany, Italy, and Japan.

It is no coincidence that these were the three countries that faced defeat in the Second World War. In a bid to ensure that it would be hard for an excessively strong executive (and subsequently an all-powerful leader) to emerge, they adopted a framework wherein at least part of the seats would be based on a doctrine of proportionality. This, however, has come with its own bag of worms. 

Take Italy, for instance. Seeking to temper the authority of the executive by ensuring a rationalised parliamentary mechanism that would necessitate some form of coalition building (as opposed to an unchallenged majority), a mixed system was put in place.

Although subject to technical changes through a string of amendments over the last decade, 2/3 of the seats in the Italian parliament are on the basis of proportional representation based on party lists. To form a government, multiple parties thus have to collectively form a coalition majority on the basis of much negotiation and compromise.

From here, it tends to go downhill. Parties often have to completely dilute their ideological stance just to align with other parties on the opposite end of the political spectrum. Unable to see eye-to-eye, coalitions frequently fall apart. As a result, government after government fell in Italy, unable to get through the entirety of their terms.

The political deadlocks paved the way for excessive technocratic interference in Italian politics. Fatigued by the constant change in government and the frequency of elections occurring in advance, it was only a matter of time before the voting population turned to strong populist leaders in the hope of some semblance of political stability. 

This is just one example, albeit an illustrative one. Even in Japan, controversial constitutional provisions like Article 9 (the basis for their post-war demilitarised pacifist policy) have constantly escaped amendment because ruling governments have been unable to muster an adequate majority. Even in the German Bundestag, a paradise for many constitutional lawyers, the appointment of the Chancellor can be potentially dependent upon much negotiation among a coalition. 

Initial discourse on the Indian Constitution, prior to its drafting, showed immense foresight pertaining to these matters. The founding fathers were acutely aware that unless the country had a strong and stable government, it would be near impossible to overcome the hurdle of keeping a newly independent nation united.

Furthermore, the electoral system would only be truly efficacious if it was intelligible and accountable to the mass electorate, a large proportion at that point not having access to full education.  

In summary, as attractive as a proportional electoral system might seem, extrapolating it to an Indian context will be no easy task. Nor will it be a problem for all solutions, since in the electoral game, a “one size fits all” mentality is just not applicable.

Electoral systems develop over time as the result of many complex factors colliding, and even then, each system comes with its significant issues. In a bid to resolve these issues, countries often over-compromise, leading to an even more inefficient formula. So even though it is pertinent for healthy discourse to remain at the forefront, let’s not be hasty to jump to any conclusions. 

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BY DHRUV BANERJEE

THE GEOSTRATA

info@thegeostrata.com