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We live in times when the global community stands at an inflexion point in history. The world is witnessing a tectonic shift in global power play. The extraordinary rise of India is a case in point. With the Global South coming of age and the world getting increasingly polarised, it is all the more important to understand its history and cultural moorings. The question of co-responsibility for global governance has thus become all the more pressing.
Illustration by The Geostrata
The Indo-Pacific Region refers indistinguishably to the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. The Indo-Pacific, which comprises the countries of Eastern Africa, East and South Asia, the South China Sea, Taiwan, Japan, Indonesia, and Australia thus includes some of the world's most populous nations and some erstwhile as well as contemporary great powers.
The Indo-Pacific is a maritime region that links Europe and the Americas to Asia. In that sense, the Indo-Pacific constitutes a highly relevant geostrategic and economic area for the United States, the European Union, and other great powers.
The concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific introduced by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has extensively been promoted worldwide; it implies that countries can operate without coercion and engage in commerce and investment more straightforwardly. Japan was the first country to apply the notion. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe emphasised that Japan always strives toward this objective, which focuses on constructing and developing new connecting corridors. A similar notion was used by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The Indo-Pacific region's primary focus is on oceans, and India plays a critical strategic role in the Indian Ocean. Indo-Pacific connectivity requires greater maritime connectivity between India and its trading partners.
Prime Minister Abe's Indo-Pacific strategy cuts against President Xi Jinping's colossal Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which yields Chinese influence over Eurasia and Africa. Housed within the BRI, China has already gained a foothold using the ports of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Tanzania. Of late, Japan has watched China ascend.
What Japan never realised was the final outcome - China would end up mired in overcapacity and oversupply. The BRI started as a means to absorb the overcapacity for China. But it has transformed from an economic undertaking to a soft power venture, and now into a hard power bargaining chip.
While the Indo-Pacific area is defined by connectivity, it is also characterised by intense competition. One source of contention stems from China's ascent. For India and Japan, both of whom rely on marine ties, China is not just a major commercial partner but also a possible security danger. China's threat stems from its prospective ability to attack important national economic and energy interests.
In 2007, Japan, India, the United States, and Australia formed what became known as the 'Quad', an informal alliance based on similar ideals of democracy and the rule of law, as well as a mutual commitment to safeguard the stability of their marine commons in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad works to safeguard the Asia-Pacific power balance.
At the time, the Obama administration used the term ‘Asia-Pacific’; when US President Donald Trump took office, the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) began using the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ to encompass the idea of increased Indian involvement while also isolating China. The European Union strongly supports the Indo-Pacific concept as well.
If current illiberal trends continue, the Indo-Pacific region will most likely be divided between ‘free and repressive visions’ - but not between liberal democracies like India and authoritarian autocracies like Laos. There exist important swing states such as Indonesia and Thailand in an intermediate zone, with some democratic traits (such as regular elections) and repressive elements (such as restrictions on free expression).
If this trend continues, we can expect a split Indo-Pacific, with democratic administration on the islands stretching from Japan to New Zealand, an autocratic mainland Asia, and an illiberal Indian Ocean rim with the exception of democratic India.
However, other nations in the region, particularly South Korea and the Philippines, are not actively involved in the concept of the Indo-Pacific, raising concerns about the region's true success and institutionalisation.
South Asia, which is torn between democracy and autocracy, may combine features of both systems to maintain electoral domination by religiously majority parties as seen in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the traditional elite-dominated, patrimonial politics found in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines may coexist with new parties representing younger people, as seen in Thailand and Malaysia.
Image Credits: Rightful Owner
Over the next decade, it is likely that the big powers; India, China, and the United States—will work to maintain their dominance and exert significant influence in their respective sectors of South Asia, mainland East Asia, and maritime East Asia. This continuity also means that the major regime types in each region would most likely persist, with a more democratically inclined maritime East Asia firmly linked to the US alliance, and a primarily autocratic mainland East Asia still influenced by China.
South Asia is the wildcard. It is densely populated, diverse, and relatively poor by GDP per Capita; democracy has never been stable there except in India, nor has outright despotism. The diverse countries of South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region could be the swing states between authoritarian and democratic futures for the wider picture of the Indo-Pacific.
Indeed the free and fair Indo-Pacific should be people-oriented and with knowledge connectivity rather than just nation-centred policies to underpin the vitality of the region.
BY GARGI TAMBOLI & ANISH KALE
TEAM GEOSTRATA
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