The Future of Great Power Politics

Pile on the Common Man’s burden,

And through the World proclaim,

That ye are Freedom’s agent,

There’s no more paying game!

The screaming of your Eagle (or Dragon),

Shall drown out the victim’s sob!

Go on through fire and slaughter,

There’s dollars on the job!

The intransigent issue of Great Power Politics, progressing from the days of Rome and Carthage to those of Great Britain and France to those of the USA and the USSR, has mutated into a new form today: that of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China.

Illustration by The Geostrata

Having been in a state of tension since the inception of the PRC, Sino-American relations have had their ups and downs just like those of any two great powers, wherein one wishes to either displace or destroy the other.

This, therefore, begs the question: what does fate have in store for these countries?

Will the U.S. and China ever engage in War?

The main and obvious factor in determining the course of the future of great power rivalry between the U.S. and China is the possibility of war between the two sides. It is no secret that the US and China have gone through multiple confrontations that have greatly escalated tensions, some even to the brink of conflict.

There have been incidents such as the Chinese spy balloon over US territory and aggressive manoeuvres in the South China Sea that have not been taken lightly by the US. On the other hand, the high-profile visits to Taiwan by U.S officials have in turn led to China’s aggressive military posturing around the island nation.

Moreover, there has been an expansion in their military presences in the south China Sea, such as the construction of military bases in the Spratly islands and the U.S. deepening their security partnership with allied nations in the Asia Pacific such as Japan and Philippines.

It is highly likely that in the case of war, the Indo-Pacific will be the potential battleground for the U.S.-PRC conflict. 

This can be evidenced by a few factors, namely (i) PRC’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its subsequent assertive behaviour challenges regional stakeholders and ultimately the US; (ii) Taiwan’s democratic principles, when combined with the defence commitment made to the country through Article 3(3) of the Taiwan Relations Act, makes U.S. commitment to protect the island nation against Chinese aggression obligatory; (iii) The geographical proximity of the region from Mainland China and U.S. military assets such as the Seventh Fleet, which is based in Japan; (iv) the equation of the military abilities of the PRC and the US, which has become more evident post the 1990 reforms that increased technological advancement at an astronomical rate.

Moreover, as the two main powers in the Asia-Pacific, their interactions significantly influence the stability and sustainability of diplomacy and trade.

However, we one to note the other side of this coin, John Mearsheimer, in his book `The Tragedy of Great Power Politics', argues that a bipolar system, where two dominant states hold the majority of power, is the most stable form of power relations.

Coincidentally, two years prior to Mearsheimer, it was Robert Ross, in his seminal work “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century”, who seems to have used the very same argument to emphasise the impossibility of conflict between the US and China due to bipolarity and perfect equity in terms of military power between the two sides.

While some of Mr Ross’ arguments might be outdated, Ross’ and Mearsheimer’s arguments still hold great significance today to argue that the future of US-China power relations in the Asia-Pacific is relatively stable.

The stability of the US-PRC system is reinforced by the fact that the Asia-Pacific has now been equally divided between the two sides in terms of spheres of influence and balance of power. While PRC has been able to capture its influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and subsequent infrastructure projects in Asia, the U.S. has established strong alliances with key regional partners in the region such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia.

This balance of power means that neither side can dominate the other without facing resistance. 

THE CASE OF TRADE

Trade has been one of the most important drivers of the U.S.-China relationship. When China acceded to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, the Americans were hopeful that this move would promote reform in China while also benefiting them by lower prices and access to Chinese markets, a very lucrative opportunity.

However, this hope quickly turned sour as fear started taking over American minds, as PRC’s exorbitant rise in imports meant the US was having a massive trade deficit with China. This, in turn, led to American manufacturing jobs declining at an alarming rate, with about a 34% decline in manufacturing jobs by 2015.

In 2018,

Donald Trump, who ran his presidential campaign to bring back manufacturing jobs, increased tariffs on Chinese imports. This was the official declaration of a trade war on China. These tariffs were aimed at discouraging Chinese manufacturers from selling in the United States, while also tackling the issues of intellectual property theft and reducing the trade deficit.

After Joe Biden assumed the presidency in 2021, he continued to impose these tariffs, as well as further introducing new tariffs in order to deter China’s rapid technological advance, thus protecting their own national security interests.

From here on, there are some scenarios that can shape the economic relationship between the United States and China. First, and the most likely scenario would be maintaining the status-quo, that is to keep the situation as it is: manage the trade competitions between both sides; both countries maintain economic ties but also impose restrictions to protect their national interests. This scenario helps in preventing further economic disruptions.

However, it also means that any sort of imbalance in restrictions by either side will lead to disastrous consequences for the U.S. and China, perhaps even another full-blown trade war.

The second scenario is the decoupling of the two economies. It involves increasing tariffs and severely restricting and monitoring any investment between the two sides.

However, both sides are aware that pursuing this scenario is highly risky and dangerous for both sides, as consumers and manufacturers will be required to bear the brunt of this development, if it ever happens. This could cause great unrest within the people and severely threaten the top leadership in both countries. While implementing the policy of decoupling will lead to a significant decline in popular support in the U.S., it will be a death blow to the already-fragile Chinese leadership.

The third scenario is reestablishing complete cooperation between the two sides. However, this scenario is highly unlikely to occur anytime soon in the future, as it requires significant diplomatic efforts, but it is a preferred scenario to continue the bipolar relationship that can keep the world together from falling apart.

A POSSIBLE CONFLICT IN OUTER SPACE

The concept of warfare, when put together with politics, can both wholly change and yet remain the same: therefore, it would be correct to underline the position that in today’s power dynamic that is locked in a zweikampf between the USA and the PRC, the very nature of war itself has changed, for there exists no longer a line of division between a state of peace and a state of war, and it is this state of cold hostility that has launched a struggle for dominance in the domain of outer space also.

The presence of military assets in outer space, though outlawed by the Outer Space Treaty, is currently an issue that has led to somewhat of a neo-arms race: ignoring the clauses of the convention in question, and by claiming that the presence of said assets in outer space is for defensive purposes and to deter hostility in outer space, both the US and the PRC are moving quickly to establish i) strategic alliances; and ii) military holdings such as reconnaissance satellites and counter space weaponry.

This has been evidenced through several instances: both the United States and PRC established their outer space militaries by the end of the 2010s— the former instituted the United States Space Force in 2019, while the latter created the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force in 2014, which has now been divided into the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and the Joint Logistic Support Force.

With the fundamental requirement of a military service which would solely operate in outer space satisfied, these two countries are now pursuing the aforementioned objectives of strategic alliances in outer space and a military buildup in the domain: the former is seen through the USSF’s launching of Operation Olympic Defender, a multinational defence initiative involving the US, the UK, Canada and Australia to optimise space operations, improve mission assurance, and synchronising efforts of its current members; the latter noted through the PRC’s increased investments in space-based intelligence and actively developing counter-space capabilities, including kinetic-kill missiles and ground-based lasers, quoting the Pentagon’s 2023 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.

The most noticeable shift of both the US and the PRC from previous doctrines of passive positional operations to offensive operational readiness acts as both a symptom and an addition to the Sino-American problem: while the very act of militarisation in outer space is caused by the tensions that characterise current relations between the two countries.

It further increases the potential of a conflict on both regional and global scales, a very clear example of which is the PRC’s tripling of the amount of intelligence and reconnaissance satellites it has on orbit, building a kill web over the Pacific Ocean to find, track, and target United States military capabilities, quoting General Whiting, the USSF commander.

But as potentials go, the actual risk of a conflict caused by a blow-up of great power rivalry is tempered yet again by economic and strategic consideration, that is, if were one to consider the nature of said conflict to be conventional: after all, war is but a continuation of politics by other means, and what is the current balance of the world order if not political? That is a question that remains unanswered.

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BY ABHINAV POLUDASU AND ADITYA PRATAP SINGH PHOGAT

TEAM GEOSTRATA

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