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The Japan we once knew - an economic powerhouse with pacifist principles - seems to be quickly changing now. With a long history of militarism and wars, Japan became a symbol of peace, with no intentions to adopt a military posture at all, naturally not looking to create any rivalries around them.
Illustration by The Geostrata
However, with more assertive enemies coming to the forefront, Japan is now forced to confront these challenges, which have thus been the cause of their evolving military policy. What is this evolving military policy, what does it entail and why is this important?
HISTORY
As most of the world remembers, Japan was decimated by the United States during World War 2, with atomic weapons dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Post the defeat, Japan has maintained a pacifist policy, which has been underscored by Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution after the war, which states:
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”
While the paragraph following the above in Article 9 states that Japan is not permitted to have a military, Japan went on to partially rearm themselves in 1950 and revised the constitution to permit “self-defensive military action”, after the United States and Japan signed the Security Treaty during the height of the Korean War. This established the Japanese Self Defence Forces, or the JSDF.
It should be noted that the JSDF was initiated to only act in self defence, which was further solidified after the Cold War. However, with the region under constant duress, fuelled by China’s effort to build islands in the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China, Japan has expanded its operations around the country, maintaining international law and limiting their manpower.
This pacifism, however, seemed to shift a bit. As mentioned in the earlier paragraph, East Asia and the Asia-Pacific were under significant stress. This led former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to attempt to amend Article 9 again to legally recognise the JSDF in the constitution.
However, the amendment required a two-thirds majority in the Upper House of the Japanese Parliament and ultimately failed. Nevertheless, Shinzo Abe’s proposal brought to the spotlight the importance of Japan to develop its military doctrine if it has to pose a stern challenge to China and North Korea, and potentially deter these countries from escalating tensions in the Asia-Pacific.
FUMIO KISHIDA AND JAPAN’S PIVOT
After the brief period of Prime Ministership from Yoshihide Suga, in came Fumio Kishida, who was remarkably quite tough on Japan’s defence policy. Very soon, Fumio Kishida set out on a path to reinforce its defence policies, fortify Japan’s military capabilities, and strengthen its alliances with the United States and other Western powers. Most notably, Japan released a list of three security documents that cement Japan’s intentions concerning its defence policy, and why it is increasingly important to them.
THE THREE SECURITY DOCUMENTS
The Kishida Administration approved three strategic documents on December 16th, 2022, called the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Build-Up Program. These papers include matters of security and defense and conceptualise deterrence, interdicting and repelling attacks, and termination of conflicts.
However, this was not the first time that these security documents were released. It was in 2013 that they were first produced. They were formerly known as National Defense Program Guidelines (presently the NDS), and Medium Term Defense Program (presently the Defense Build-Up Program) and were revised in 2018.
Now what do these revisions signify? And how are they different from the previous papers? We understand these by looking at their threats, shifts in military policy, and increased defence budget.
Firstly, Japan recognises China as its primary threat now. The updated papers describe Japan’s issues in the globe and then in the Indo-Pacific. It is clear that in the Indo-Pacific Japan has three major threats: China, North Korea and Russia. This is very contrasting to the 2013 Version of NSS that deemed it “critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas’.
We see a lot of changes in the language; while earlier they expressed ‘concern’ about China which has now become a matter of serious concern for Japan’. China is also referred to in these documents as Japan’s ‘greatest strategic challenge’.
We shall analyze further by looking at what has changed in the warfighting doctrine from territorial defence to in-depth interdiction. The new documents also provide a sharp contrast from their past principles of “the Exclusively Defense-oriented Policy’’ defined as:
“A passive defense strategic posture in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, such as the use of defensive force only when the nation is subjected to an armed attack by an opponent, the means and methods of the attack limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and the defense capabilities to be maintained limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense”
This has not been included in the current version of the definition.
The document talks a lot about the counter strike capability. Let us start by elaborating on it. Counter strike capabilities that can leverage stand-off defense and other capabilities can be a key to deterring invasion against Japan.
This was done because of the fact that missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat since the dramatic advances in technology that have improved the missile forces in the region both qualitatively and quantitatively. And Japan can not tackle it alone with its existing defense network, relying solely upon ballistic missile defenses. Needless to say, Counterstrikes are the need of the hour for Japan’s self defense.
They are also in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. While they do not really change Japan’s exclusive defense oriented policy and are aligned with Japan’s Constitution and International law limits, they shall be used ONLY when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. They reaffirm Japan’s commitment to enact the ‘minimum necessary measures for self defence’.
Let us get to know about the budget now. Documents assure an increase in Japan's defence budget to over 40 trillion yen over the next five years. However, it is important to note that the implication of the budgetary policies remains unclear as the revenue sources required to draw on such fund spending are not enclosed. Not to mention that Japan’s budget has already fallen out of balance due to the country’s massive social security expenditures.
Now, what do these documents set out to achieve?
IT ALL STARTS WITH CHINA
For starters, one of the main factors that signals this change is China’s rapid expansion militarily in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. Over the past two decades, China has evidently diverted significant amounts of money and resources towards upgrading and expanding its military capabilities and investing heavily in its navy and missile technology. This is a real cause of concern for Japan, especially due to its fractured historic relationship with China in WW2 and before that.
China’s assertive behaviour in the East China Sea, especially with reference to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between both sides, is going to be Japan’s main issue and will cause major developments in its military forces.
These islands have been repeatedly claimed by China but are controlled by the Japanese, but China’s frequent intrusions in Japanese airspace and waters in the form of regular patrols and its Coast Guard suggests that they are willing to use force if necessary to wrest back control of the islands from the Japanese.
This is a real and direct threat for Japan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Another reason for Japan’s worry about China can be traced back to China’s increasingly popular influence over regional and international organisations, which makes Japan’s important positions in these forums in jeopardy.
Another reason for Japan’s concern about China is the latter's growing influence over regional and international organizations, which threatens Japan's important positions in these forums. With China’s economic and military might (to some extent), they look to alter a few rules and principles in these organisations that favour their way of thinking, especially in the case of non-interference in human rights in any territory.
Moreover, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can simply be a way for it to expand its strategic influence, sometimes even close to the Japanese mainland. For a country that is very dependent on trade routes due to its geography, Japan will be vary of the fact that China can use this strategic influence to create some form of maritime choke points that can put Japan at a severe disadvantage.
ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
The United States:
Apart from the documents, there is another facet that drives the rapid evolution of Japan’s military doctrine, and that is the case of strengthening alliances and forming new partnerships in the Asia-Pacific, which have very quickly become one of the defining factors of Tokyo’s strategy. By enabling such alliances, Japan looks to enhance their defence capabilities while also counterbalancing China’s overarching influence, which we have elucidated in the previous section.
The most important alliance of all will undoubtedly be the United States, the foundation of Japan’s military policy. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the United States has pledged to defend Japan, in order for the United States to access Japanese bases and continue their military operations in Asia. This alliance has been the main show of strength for the Western bloc in the region, while also maintaining the status quo.
In order to further strengthen this cooperation, both Tokyo and Washington have taken some very important steps to do so. Joint military exercises, coordinating missile defence systems, and collaborating in arenas such as space and cyber warfare have been very useful for Japan to bolster their military posture while working together on responding to any sort of threat in Asia.
For instance, the United States and Japan have worked closely in defending the Ryukyu/Nansei Islands, the chain of islands ranging from Kyushu to Taiwan, in order to closely monitor Chinese naval activity.
The United States alliance also means that Tokyo also has access to broader multilateral organisations that they can work within the Indo-Pacific. This is best described by the advent of the Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The Quad is important for Japan to maintain the status quo in the region, while also focusing on the West’s principle of maintaining an open Indo-Pacific.
Southeast Asia:
Another major set of alliances to address is the case of Southeast Asia, which has now become integral to Japan’s policy if they are to be a counterbalance to China’s aspirations in the South China Sea.
One of the most important headlines of July has been the signing of the Japan-Philippines defence pact, which enables both sides to take part in military exercises and live fire drills. This is big news for Japan given the Philippines' location and the feud between Manila and Beijing. With this pact, Japan ensures an important alliance while contributing to the stability of the Asia-Pacific itself.
Apart from the Philippines, Japan has also been making strides in engaging with other Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN, with initiatives like the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the Technical Agreement between Japan and ASEAN taking center stage in their relationship.
This cooperation has meant that there has been more dialogue on maritime security, work with the Japanese concerning disaster management, and most importantly, sharing Japan and its allies’ vision to preserve alliances and partnerships such as this to counter external threats.
However, Japan needs to engage with the ASEAN countries on a bilateral basis, such as what they did with the Philippines, if Japan truly wants to strengthen its relationship with Southeast Asia.
BY ABHINAV POLUDASU AND PREETU MAHARSHI
TEAM GEOSTRATA
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