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Understanding the contemporary relations between the existing states in the Korean Peninsula highlights the contemporary diplomatic behaviours between both countries: one of them being rather unconventional and deemed as “propagandist”. With North Korea using balloons carrying bags containing “filth” or “trash”, it becomes observable how Pyongyang uses newer tactics of spreading propaganda as retaliation to North Korean defectors and South Korean activists.
Illustration by The Geostrata
However, this article argues otherwise: whilst propagandist in nature, these tactics inculcate grander narratives hidden behind them, with current developments in relations not necessarily being a positive trend. As such, it becomes rather interesting to observe contemporary relations behind this already-interesting move; and thereby understand trends of such development in the near future.
STATING THE SITUATION
Unfolding such an interesting situation of retaliation between two countries becomes rather interesting to observe, with both sides accumulating tit-for-tat tactics in order to prevail on the scenarios of unconventional use of diplomatic practices. Undertaking an unusual step, the North Korean regime initiated the campaigns of sending ‘trash balloons’ across the heavily fortified border to South Korea, beginning in late May this year.
The concerned balloons, whilst having achieved controversial perceptions within the realm of International Politics, have garnered highlights in a spectacular manner: with them carrying cigarette buds, toilet paper, scraps of cloth, and suspected animal faeces. Certain photos released by the South Korean military displayed rubbish strewn around fallen balloons, with one having the word “excrement” written on it.
According to a police report obtained by the Representative of the Democratic Party of Korea Yang Bu-nam, such balloons were observed at around 3000 locations across South Korea between May 28th and July 25th, carried through 10 consecutive campaigns.
Whilst contaminants delivered by such balloons have been deemed safe and provoking no risks as such, it did bring about incidences that have been viewed negatively throughout disrupting flights at Incheon International Airport, causing a rooftop fire at a residence in Gyeonggi province, and even landing trash on the compound of South Korea’s Presidential Office. Further records of property damage highlight an estimation of about $19,000.
The rationale for such undertaking by North Korea becomes observable through a continuum of transborder activities: for years South Korean activists and North Korean defectors have been sending propagandist pamphlets questioning North Korean regime legitimacy, as well as bringing counter-narratives to highlight the outside world.
With instruments of delivery containing pen drives with K-pop content, rice, dollar bills, as well as medicines: thereby leading to such retaliation. Whilst such propagandist tactics were banned in 2020 under former South Korean president Moon Jae-in, rulings by the Constitutional Court in 2023 declared the ban as unconstitutional and limiting freedom of speech: thereby provoking a continuum of such “psychological campaigns”.
OTHER NUANCES
Yet nuances towards the situation lead to just a scratch to the surface. There exist deeper narratives that have been underlined well enough in the realms of international politics, thereby sugarcoating the ongoing balloon incident into a mere translation of the heightened tensions in the peninsula. This could be recorded, and thereby comprehended into three particular developments:
First, aspects of the reunification of the Korean peninsula under a single leadership have achieved no results post-2018, and further developments towards the same can be observed to be a long shot.
On January 15th this year, North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, in his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly, announced newer prospects for foreign relations with South Korea, stating the impossibility of national restoration and reunification due to the confrontational state policy of South Korea.
Further declaring South Korea as a “Foreign State”, the speech expressed hostility towards the concerned nation; which was followed by announcements to disband organisations focused on changes with South Korea: including the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, and the Northern Headquarters of the Pan-national Alliance for Korean Reunification, among others.
This was further observed through the leader’s orders to demolish the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification, built by Kim Jong-Il, the former Supreme Leader. The effectiveness of such changes towards foreign policy stances was observed on rather quicker terms: with the state-sponsored media network presenting a map highlighting only the Northern region of the peninsula as red, which otherwise displayed the entire Korean peninsula with the said colour.
Second, newer policy stances undertaken by the current South Korean President Yoon-Suk yeol: foreign and domestic alike, have observed stark differences in attitude displaying over its predecessor, President Moon Jae-in.
With contemporary South Korean relations observing certain shifts towards fostering relations with the United States and Japan, power dynamics have observed significant changes: towards a condition not being particularly favourable for inter-Korean collaboration or rather, reunification.
For instance, November of 2023 observed Pyongyang halting any adherence and acceptance towards the September 19 North-South Military Agreement, as a retaliation towards the signing of the “Washington Declaration'' between South Korea and the United States; and thereby towards the Nuclear Consultative Group as such.
Further evidence aligns with the same: with the South Korean Defense Minister highlighting the primary role of the army’s missile strategic command, stating that their prime role is to “lethally strike the heart and head of enemy”, following Pyongyang’s launching of military reconnaissance satellite: the incident eventually leading to the said November 2023 statement.
Such domestic shifts have been observed as ring-wing interpretations of liberal democratic structures, thereby promoting identity-based foreign policy narratives that limit any undertakings towards mitigating social conflicts, achieving unity, and resolving Korea’s political division.
Third, recent developments in military strategies, technologies as well as alliances indicate heightened tensions between the concerned countries, peculiarly described throughout literature as a return to the Cold War system of allegiance and competition.
For instance, halting the September 19 North-South Military Agreement further observed increasing North Korean military activities, with the firing of over 200 artillery shells off its west coast, toward the Yeonpyeong Islands (belonging to South Korea); with Seoul ordering civilians on the island to seek shelter before conducting its military drills near the border.
Further developments have been observed: recent testing of Pyongyang’s hypersonic missiles; and testing of “Haeil-5-23”, an underwater nuclear arsenal as a retaliation to joint naval exercises.
At the same time, the Supreme Leader’s attempt to modernise military capabilities (in accordance with comments from the Leader’s Eight Party Congress in January 2021) further has indicated developments of MIRV, with speculations towards the heightened possibility of ICBMs being developed.
If the situation wasn’t tense enough, Seoul’s strategy indicates underlying principles of preemptive strikes: Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). Whilst the said strategy was announced following Pyongyang’s fifth nuclear test in 2016, such strategy might garner little benefit, if not invalidate its entire logic, at contemporary: such logic of punishment further invites Pyongyang to undertake unprecedented steps as it modernises its arsenal, thereby driving forward possibilities of the regional arms race.
CONCLUSION: PROPAGANDA OR SHIFTS IN GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS?
Refocusing debate towards the use of balloons draws connections to ongoing manipulative contestations between North and South Korea, drawing instability on various aspects: yet displaying in terms of military securitisation as well as public demonstration through diplomatic tactics.
Image Credits: Bloomberg
Such tactics or strategies to be precise; highlight a central argument: How does one interpret the balloon strategy used by Pyongyang? For one, the use of balloons pertains to a usual tactic: it has been a preferred tactic used by the Koreans since the Korean War. The distinctiveness lies in the containment of waste products.
Three particular arguments can be highlighted through such analysis:
It could be an undertaking to showcase shifting domestic conditions within the North Korean regime, highlighting a sense of self-reliance and thereby; propagating such achievements through such balloons.
Increasing variety, amount, and sophistication of waste products being extorted to South Korea deliver the increasing self-reliance or ‘Juche’; propagating the regime’s push for greater diversification of consumer goods and structuralisation of the industrial sector of North Korea.
It could indicate further initiation of newer dimensions towards developing diplomatic relations with the United States as well as South Korea. Pyongyang’s tactics towards Seoul have been rather a cyclical one: turning soft toward liberal heads of government whilst presuming hostility towards conservative ones.
The rationale for this remains simple: Pyongyang expects greater returns of benefits when engaging with liberal leaders more willing to promote harmonious cooperation; in order to weaken the ‘adversarial alliance’.
With the United States overstretching its presence towards China and Russia, the contemporary period becomes well-suited for Pyongyang to preserve its sovereignty whilst engaging through provocations: portraying a need for shifts in domestic political circumstances within the United States and South Korea in order to maintain constructive relations with Pyongyang.
It could further indicate a diabolic shift of attention towards such unconventional means of diplomatic undertaking. With contemporary nuances highlighting tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul on multiple layers; such undertakings highlight the diversion of attention from securitisation and overt-provocations by the North Korean regime.
Increasing diplomatic relations with Russia further highlights such securitisation (as observed through a mutual defence agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang during Putin’s visit). Whilst such actions were met with retaliation by Seoul, the continuum of extorting ‘trash balloons’ diverted much attention to mere propagandist tactics.
North Korea benefits more from peace than from war: North Korea is able to preserve its military readiness without engaging in conflict: by supplying arms to Russia and maintaining constructive relations with China; none of which could be possible without inter-Korean peace.
Concluding, it would be rather spectacular to observe the forward trends of inter-Korean relationships. The strategy of using balloons in a peculiar manner has highlighted multi-layered normative ways to understand contemporary relations.
However, what becomes rather observable is the intentions hidden within such tactics: something Pyongyang has seemingly mastered to deliver over the years. A need for change is required to deal with such manipulation: newer forms of engagement whilst limiting any provocative actions by Pyongyang, whilst at the same time developing relations on the lines of issues common to both parties. In the end, Pyongyang’s diplomatic strategy with Seoul is rather a cyclical action over lineal development.
BY ABHIGYAN DUARAH
TEAM GEOSTRATA
Very interesting take. It is just so bizzare that the situation is such that sending balloons filled with trash to the neighboring country is still the least deadly thing Pyongyang could have done xD