Over centuries the Himalayas have been vital for India’s geopolitical significance, climate influence, rich resources such as water, biodiversity, and cultural heritage. As per the historical timeline of the Indian subcontinent, the foreign invasions have prominently occurred from the eastern part of the Hindu Kush Mountain range through the Khyber Pass and from the maritime routes of the Indian Ocean Region.

Illustration by The Geostrata
In 1951, China became India's immediate neighbour on the northern frontier when it annexed Tibet. Ever since, the northern frontier which is predominantly guarded by the Himalayas, became vulnerable to Chinese incursions.
The mountains have become strategic assets within the strategic framework of India and China, providing a substantial edge and the lack of the same to both entities.
This article will delve into the complex interplay of the strengths and weaknesses of India and China within the realm of the Himalayas in their respective defence policies.
CONTESTATION OVER THE BORDER
China’s claim over Tibet solidified as it established its territorial sovereignty after invading it in 1951. Therefore, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) under Chinese sovereignty shares a border with India that is over 4050 km long, out of which 3900 km is the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The contestation over the border is a major hurdle in the India-China relations. The ambiguity due to different connotations of LAC in each sector is the factor that has long drawn the dispute.
The LAC includes three sectors: Western, Central, and Eastern. The Western sector includes the Indian Union Territory (UT) of Ladakh, where India claims the Johnson Line of 1865 as the official line, whereas the Macartney-Macdonald Line is the border according to the Chinese claims, which is where the current LAC lies.
The 2020 military skirmishes occurred in this sector in the valley of River Galwan. There are several contested points such as Pangong Tso, Demchok, Depsang Plains, etc. Comparatively, the Central Sector has fewer disputed areas, and it includes Shipki pass, Barahoti, Nilang-Jadang, etc.
Currently, the major focus is on the Eastern Sector, known as the McMahon Line, based on the Simla Convention of 1914. This includes the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese claim as South Tibet, and intrudes into the territory, famously known as their Salami-Slicing tactic.
ADVATNGE FOR CHINA: TIBET FACTOR
The territory of Tibet is bestowed with untapped resources such as water, minerals, and energy. The Tibetan Plateau is known as the world’s Third Pole and Water Tower of Asia. The plateau has a geostrategic location becoming a strategic asset for China to expand its infrastructural ambitions; linking itself to Central Asian Republics, and to Pakistan for gaining a considerably better access to the maritime route via the Arabian Sea.
The Tibetan region is at the crossroads of Central Asia, East Asia, and South Asia, providing an opportunity for China to expand its strategic and economic influence through its flagship project of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a key sub-project as per the Chinese.
Tibet, which features a plateau has proved advantageous for construction of infrastructure such as highways and railways, a geostrategic luxury India does not possess being on the other side of the Himalayas.
The Xinjiang Tibet Highway, also known as G219 National Highway, connects Xinjiang to Lhatse, which further joins G318 till the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. The highway passes through the disputed territory of Aksai Chin, an Indian territory claimed by the Chinese.
THE HIMALAYAS: AN HINDRANCE TO INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT ?
On the Indian side of the Himalayas, the rough terrain proves to be a hurdle for road infrastructure, deployment of troops, logistics movement, etc. Due to the rugged terrain and sub-zero temperatures in several sectors, the movement of the forces closer to the front is slower on the Indian side than on the Chinese.
The geological factors such as melting of glaciers, seismic activity, difficult terrain, harsh climatic conditions, and fragile ecology further intensify the hindrance towards development in the region. With an advantage of massive roadway and railway networks, the Chinese have an edge due to the plateau feature of Tibet over the ruggedness on the Indian side.
Amidst all the challenges, the Border Roads Organisation is involved in improving the connectivity of the region. The work in progress has accelerated in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and UTs of J&K and Ladakh.
The newly inaugurated Sela Tunnel,which is an all-weather tunnel on the Balipara-Chariduar-Tawang road, connects Tezpur in Assam to Tawang, near the border front in Arunachal Pradesh.
Apart from the two traditional connectivity routes of Srinagar-Leh and Manali-Leh, there is a third option to connect landlocked Leh by the Nimmu-Padum-Darcha (NPD) road. The new alternative is not only time-efficient but also avoids passing through four difficult passes that are located on the Manali-Leh National Highway.
Along the LAC, the 255-km-long Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road is a significantly strategic all-weather road, proven to trigger the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Amidst the challenges posed by the terrain, the Indian Government, alongside the Indian Army and its Border Roads Organisation, has taken massive strides towards accelerating the construction of infrastructure, especially roads, tunnels, and bridges, along the LAC. A notable railway line is the 22 km Harmuti-Naharlagun line in Arunachal Pradesh, which is a strategic connectivity in the Eastern Sector.
AIR POWER CAPABILITIES AT THE HIMALAYAN HEIGHTS: INDIA AND CHINA
In terms of Air Power in the Himalayas, India has a tactical advantage over China, unlike the case of the road infrastructure. This is due to the vast and rapid elevation change which is efficient for take-offs. The valleys and foothills are strategic locations for the construction of runways and helipads. This territorial asymmetry allows aircraft to take off in denser air with ability to carry a full load.
On the other hand, the Chinese Air Force bases are at a relatively higher altitude on the Tibetan Plateau. This makes take-offs and reduces their ability to carry fuel and material loads. Therefore, the Himalayas prove to be advantageous for India with regards to its Air Power, as compared to China.
India has few strategically important advanced landing grounds (ALG) like Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), Fukche and Nyoma in the UT of Ladakh, and several in the Eastern Sector such as Pasighat, Walong, etc.
Most of these ALGs are strategically located near mountain passes to have a tactical advantage over the adversary. Considering the ALG of DBO, located near the Karakoram Pass, it provides an aerial advantage to the Indian side. Nevertheless, the Chinese too, have significantly developed airfields in Hotan, Ngari Gunsa, and Lhasa, which are extensively expanding in size and capability, according to satellite imagery analysis.
In the Himalayan terrain, Air Power is a major determinant of strategic posture between India and China. China’s Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter and a robust fleet of strategic bombers have an evident advantage over India’s fourth-generation fighters such as Sthe u-30MKI or 4.5th generation Dassault Rafales.
Both nations possess the world’s most formidable military forces; China has the world’s second-largest Air Force, while India ranks fourth. Talking numbers, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has 130 attack aircraft as compared to 371 of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Therefore, in terms of fleet size and fighter jets, PLAAF has numerical strength over IAF.
However, it is important to note that the IAF pilots are superior by experience in high-altitude combat operations.Moreover, the Indian Air Force bases are strategically placed in an arc formation from Ladakh to Assam, giving a strategic edge as compared to the PLAAF.
Additionally, the Indian Army has divided its Ground Command into three – Northern, Central, and Eastern Commands, and Air Command into three – Western, Central, and Eastern Air Commands, facing China. Whereas China has a single Western Theatre Command that orients towards India.
India, too, must integrate its theatre command to augment the efficiency among the forces. An integrated theatre command facilitates the functioning of three services to secure a specific geography.
India and China have similar ground forces, which is around 200,000 personnel. The artillery such as Dhanush 155mm/45 caliber towed howitzer and K9-Vajra self-propelled howitzers, and tanks such as T-90 Bhishma, T-72 Ajeya MBT, and BMP-2, are deployed at the heights of 13,000 feet in temperatures below minus forty degrees.
According to the Pentagon's report, the Chinese deployment includes tanks, artillery, air defence systems, and several other weapons systems. Finally, both the countries are equipped with nuclear arsenals with a wider strike range which covers the entire geographic area of the opponent.
The Himalayas play an important role, acting as a bridge or a barrier in terms of warfare strategy for both India and China. Very tactfully, these countries have applied and shaped their defence policies, warfare strategies, and tactics based upon the advantages and disadvantages of the Himalayan terrain to each side.
On one hand, the plateau of Tibet allows China to proliferate its road, railway networks, linking major towns in the region, whereas the same elevation of the plateau proves to be disadvantageous for its air power. On the other hand, the rugged Himalayan terrain challenges India to develop its infrastructure in the region, however, the elevation proves to be beneficial for the air force to demonstrate its air power capabilities.
This unfolds the significant role of the Himalayas as the major geographic tyrant for India and China’s defence strategy. The study on the role of Himalayan terrain opens a new avenue to comprehend the role of its rivers as strategic assets in warfare, as seen in the recent example of building dams on River Brahmaputra/Siang/Yarlung Tsangpo.
BY ARYA GHADIGAONKAR
TEAM GEOSTRATA