At Crossroads - China and India as Potential Mediators in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The geopolitical complexities of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have highlighted the varied responses of global powers, particularly China and India. Both nations, though differing in approach, navigate the balance between strategic alliances and the conflict’s implications for global order.

Illustration by The Geostrata

China, under President Xi Jinping, seeks to mediate with a peace initiative that, while neutral, aligns with Russian interests. This manoeuvre reflects China’s ‘dual use objectives’ of asserting global influence and safeguarding its strategic partnership with Moscow.

In contrast, India’s deliberate ambiguity avoids direct criticism of Russia while advocating dialogue. New Delhi’s neutrality, disappointing Western capitals like the U.S., is seen as a divergence from shared aspirations.

Despite this, India resists pressure to sever ties with Russia, citing long-standing relations and strategic imperatives. This raises questions about whether India genuinely seeks a mediatory role or if its stance is driven by geopolitical pragmatism and media narratives.

CHINA’S MEDIATION VISION: GENUINE PEACE EFFORT?

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi, China’s senior diplomat and one of the few international figures capable of exerting influence over Russia, had declared China’s intentions to unveil its peace initiative on the war’s anniversary.

He had disclosed that consultations with Germany, Italy, and France on the proposed plan were already underway. The initiative, as articulated by Wang, was said to emphasise on the imperative of upholding the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and adherence to the UN Charter.

Simultaneously, he underscored the necessity of acknowledging and respecting Russia’s ‘legitimate’ security concerns. China then went on to launch a 12 point proposal, ‘China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis’. 

China’s diplomatic manoeuvring is becoming increasingly apparent, as it has garnered support from both the Western bloc and the Global South.

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock expressed approval of China’s initiative, stating, ‘As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has a responsibility to leverage its influence in securing global peace.’

Baerbock noted that she had engaged in extensive discussions with Wang Yi on the concept of a just peace—emphasising that it does not entail rewarding the aggressor but rather upholding international law and defending those who have been attacked. 

Envoy Li Hui earlier characterised Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and China as representatives of the Global South and described them as “important forces in promoting world peace” noting that they share positions closely aligned with China’s.

Li, who serves as China’s special envoy for Eurasian affairs, stated, ‘These nations have maintained communication with both Russia and Ukraine and remain committed to resolving the crisis through dialogue and negotiation.’ Earlier this year, China and Brazil also jointly issued a peace plan that advocates for a peace conference involving both Ukraine and Russia.

Notably, China and Russia were absent from a peace summit hosted in Switzerland in June, with Russia not being invited and China opting not to attend.

China’s deep trade relations with Ukraine position it as a particularly suitable actor for mediation efforts. Over the three decades since Ukraine’s independence, the nation’s natural resources, defence industry, and strategic location have increasingly aligned with China’s strategic interests.

By 2019, China had surpassed Russia as Ukraine’s largest trading partner, becoming the leading importer of Ukrainian barley and iron ore, while Ukraine overtook the United States as China's primary corn supplier. Additionally, Ukraine is a significant arms supplier to China, second only to Russia, with China being the largest purchaser of Ukrainian arms. Notably, China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, is a refurbished Soviet vessel acquired from Ukraine.

While China has gained support from some Western and Global South countries and maintains substantial trade relations with Ukraine, several obstacles hinder the revisionist power’s role as a potential mediator.

CHINA’S PEACE PLAN: NEUTRALITY OF VEILED SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA?

With the release of China’s Ukraine peace plan, Xi’s administration is reaffirming China’s stance of neutrality, despite its notable obstruction of United Nations efforts to condemn the invasion.

The peace plan mirrors Russian assertions that Western governments are responsible for the February 24, 2022 invasion and also criticises the sanctions imposed on Russia. Several measures proposed by China, if implemented, provide clear advantages to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Among these is a cease-fire provision that would effectively solidify the presence of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory, along with a call for the immediate lifting of all sanctions  not approved by the UN Security Council, where Russia wields veto power.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, in a CNN interview, criticised China’s proposal, stating it should have ended with its first point on ‘respecting the sovereignty of all countries.’ He emphasised that the war could end immediately if Russia ceased its aggression and withdrew from Ukraine, noting that neither Ukraine, NATO, nor the U.S. attacked Russia, but that this conflict was a deliberate choice by Putin. 

US Secretary of State Blinken previously suggested that Beijing likely approved Chinese firms providing non-lethal, ‘dual-use’ support to Russia in its war against Ukraine, highlighting increasing U.S. concerns that China may assist in arming Putin’s forces.

Thus, the strained geopolitical relationship between China and the United States represents a significant impediment to China’s aspirations of emerging as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Whereas, New Delhi enjoys the privilege of sharing amicable ties with Washington. The United States’ dominant position within NATO and its robust ties with Ukraine complicate China’s efforts to assume a mediatory role.

A consistent strategic impetus in China’s foreign policy towards both the USSR and Russia has been the strategic approach of balancing against a mutual adversary, notably the United States. This strategy, evident throughout history, reflects China’s diplomatic manoeuvres to counter perceived threats and assert its international stance.

In February 2022, Xi and Putin announced a ‘friendship without limits.’ This ‘friendship without limits’ raises further questions about the neutrality China might exhibit as a mediator. 

INDIA’S STRATEGIC IMPETUS AMIDST THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

India has very clearly opted not to directly criticise Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, instead advocating for the resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. New Delhi has resisted Western pressure to sever its ties with Moscow, citing its long standing relationship and its economic necessities.

In recent years, the US has sought to strengthen its relationship with India, viewing India as a potential counterbalance to an expansionist China. Much before Modi’s visit to Ukraine or Russia this year, Blinken had underscored the importance of realising a just and enduring peace for Ukraine consistent with the UN Charter during a meeting with his Indian Counterpart, Dr S Jaishankar.

Despite the prominent role of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the bilateral discourse between India and the United States, it has yet to be prominently featured in the agenda of US-China bilateral discussions.

The willingness to address the Russia-Ukraine situation within the context of India-US dialogues appears markedly higher compared to its incorporation into US-China talks.

US President Joe Biden dialled Prime Minister Narendra Modi and lauded him on his peace efforts after his visits to Russia and Ukraine. In both his visits, he made it clear that ‘India was never neutral in this conflict. It was always on the side of peace’. The cordial interactions between President Vladimir V. Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi were documented during Modi’s visit to Russia in July 2024.  

Despite the Western efforts to diplomatically isolate Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, numerous countries have pursued their strategic interests in relation to Moscow, thereby enabling Putin to stabilise the Russian economy and sustain his military campaign.

Notably, India, despite its close ties with the United States, has emerged as the second-largest importer of Russian oil, following China, in the period since the invasion.

During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Russia, he expressed deep concern over the humanitarian toll of the conflict, specifically lamenting the tragic loss of children’s lives in the wake of a recent Russian offensive in Ukraine. He also reiterated a strong call for peace.

Given the rapport between Modi and Putin, there is potential for India to exert diplomatic influence on Russia in favour of maintaining peace. Furthermore, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Ukraine in August 2024, he reiterated his call for peace and strongly advocated for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in discussions with President Zelenskyy. 

While New Delhi maintains a robust relationship with Moscow, it is strategically aligned with NATO partners to a greater extent than with China. Although this may seem stark, most nations in the Global South, with the notable exceptions of India and China, are relatively marginal as potential stakeholders in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Effective mediation in such a geopolitical scenario necessitates that the mediator has favourable relations with NATO and Western states; otherwise, the mediator risks being perceived as biassed towards Russia. 

INDIA’S AMBIGUOUS POSITION AS A MEDIATOR

India’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has remained ambiguous, lacking an official proposal to the international community akin to China’s approach.

The reality, however, is more nuanced. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Ukraine appears to have been primarily an exercise in carefully balancing India’s position on the conflict. It is challenging to avoid the impression that this visit was, in part, a response to the unfavourable perceptions generated by his earlier visit to Moscow in July.

India’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stands out among major democracies and U.S. strategic partners. Despite its unease with Moscow’s actions, New Delhi has maintained a stance of public neutrality, abstaining from UN votes condemning Russian aggression.

This neutrality, viewed as disappointing by many in the United States, highlights a divergence in perspectives on the global order. For Indian strategic elites, this diplomatic neutrality is often interpreted as a ‘subtle pro-Moscow position.’ This ‘subtle pro-Moscow’ position can emerge to be an impediment to India’s potential role as a mediator.

India’s reluctance to criticise Russia is reinforced by the importance of maintaining Russia’s support in the UN Security Council, consistent with its historical forbearance in the face of previous Russian aggressions, such as in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.

This reticence is also influenced by India’s ongoing dependence on Russian military equipment, which, despite efforts to diversify, remains a critical aspect of its defence strategy. Preserving strong ties with Russia is seen as essential for balancing China, constraining Pakistan, and promoting a multipolar global system.

These factors may contribute to India’s seemingly pro-Moscow stance. However, the question remains whether India, unlike China, truly seeks to position itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Thus far, there has been speculation but no definitive statement. India's potential role as a mediator remains ambiguous; mere rhetorical calls for peace may not suffice without a formal commitment. It is plausible that India’s perceived role as a peacemaker is more a product of geopolitical rhetoric and media-driven perceptions than of clear diplomatic intent.

CONCLUSION 

The contrasting diplomatic strategies of China and India regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict reveal distinct geopolitical priorities. China’s peace initiative, while ostensibly neutral, subtly aligns with Russian interests, reflecting its broader strategy to counter U.S. influence and solidify ties with Moscow.

Despite support from some Western and Global South countries, China’s deep trade relations with Russia and historical alignment with Moscow cast doubt on the genuineness of its mediation efforts.

India’s approach, characterised by strategic ambiguity, seeks to balance its long-standing relationship with Russia with growing ties to the United States and NATO. New Delhi’s reluctance to directly criticise Russia and its call for dialogue highlight its desire to maintain strategic autonomy. However, the lack of a formal peace proposal raises questions about India’s commitment to mediation.

In conclusion, both China and India face significant challenges in establishing themselves as credible mediators in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Their respective strategies, driven by complex geopolitical calculations, may hinder their effectiveness in promoting a just and lasting peace. This underscores the difficulties in achieving meaningful mediation in a conflict deeply influenced by global power dynamics.

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BY ARTH AGARWAL

Output Desk, Republic TV

(Views are Personal)

info@thegeostrata.com