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The evolution of Article 31C within the Indian constitution reflects the complex interplay between the legislature’s initiatives for socio-economic reforms and the judiciary’s role in balancing these changes with constitutional guarantees.
Illustration by The Geostrata
Initially after Independence, most of the parliamentarians then believed that socialism was the economic model most suited to India. State control of important industries was seen as the means to achieve the objective of the greatest good of the greatest number.
Likewise, the Constituent Assembly also aimed towards building a welfare state and inter alia envisaged an end to economic exploitation and inequalities. Adhering to these principles the constitution makers framed Part IV (Articles 36-51) which lists certain directive principles of the state policy, which are the guiding principles for enacting any laws by the state but are not enforceable in any court of law.
The legislature through the 25th Amendment Act, of 1971 introduced Article 31C with the main aim of shielding laws that implement specific directive principles, especially those mentioned under Articles 39B and 39C, from being declared void on the grounds of inconsistency with the fundamental rights provided in articles 14,19 and originally 31 (right to property) which was later repealed.
However, what turned out to be dangerous was the later part of the article which prohibited any court from entertaining any petition that sought to establish that a particular law would not secure the principles laid down in articles 39B and 39C.
Article 39B emphasises that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to serve the common good.
Following this Article 39C emphasises that “the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.” Both of them had the motive of making India a socialist paradise.
The amendment came against the backdrop of judiciary challenges to government-initiated land reforms, especially to abolish the zamindari system. Among all the judicial challenges the most prominent that triggered the government and subsequently caused the enactment of Article 31C was the Bank Nationalisation case in 1969.
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, popularly known as the bank nationalisation case, was portrayed as a potential setback to the government’s objective of socialism. However, several people misunderstood the verdict and forgot that the power of the central government to nationalise banks was upheld.
The case underscored the necessity of providing a just and equivalent compensation for the appropriated property.
Post the judgment, through the 25th Amendment Act 1971, the then government in order to nullify the bank nationalization judgment substituted article 31(2) and replaced the word “compensation” with “amount”.
Consequently, the 25th Constitutional Amendment Act was challenged in the Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973), popularly known as the Fundamental Rights case. By the wafer-thin majority of 7:6, the Supreme Court held that the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited and subsequently cannot be used to alter the basic structure or the essential features of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the seven judges out of the thirteen-judge bench held that the latter part of Article 31C was unconstitutional and invalid. This ensured that the court reserved the power to review whether the particular law adhered to the principles stated in Articles 39B and C.
In an attempt to destroy the basic structure doctrine, the then ruling party introduced what H.M. Seervai called, “constitutional outrage” - the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.
The result of this amendment was that the earlier protection that was limited to laws made to implement only Articles 39B and C was now extended to any law that purported to give effect to all or any of the directive principles.
Thus, a mere declaration that a law was to secure all or any of the directive principles created an impenetrable wall and rendered articles 14,19, and 31 impotent. Subsequently, this destroyed the harmony between Part III and Part IV of the Constitution by making fundamental rights subservient to directive principles of state policies.
However, this expansion was struck down by the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills Case (1980), emphasising the fact that fundamental rights and directive principles together constituted the soul of the Constitution and the balance between them forms the basic structure of the Constitution. The verdict restored the article to its original form.
The current standing of Article 31C, specifically protects laws that implement directive principles, those mentioned under Articles 39B and 39C, from being declared void on grounds of inconsistency with the fundamental rights provided in Articles 14 and 19.
Justice Joseph (along with other judges) while hearing a case to decide whether the government can acquire and redistribute private property, observed that “once the process of substitution and insertion by way of a constitutional amendment is itself held to be bad and impermissible, the pre-amended provisions automatically resurface and revive.”
BY PEARL NIRWAN
TEAM GEOSTRATA
Insightful!
Informative
great article!🙌🏽🙌🏽